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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIJURALISM, by Jan Jakob Bornheim, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2020, ISBN 978-3-16-159168-6, 554 pp., €89. 
 
The author gives a superb account of some of the differences 
between the common law and civil law of property as they appear 
in “the Canadian experience with bijuralism.”1 His concern is “not 
with how the holder of a property right can use her property.”2 It is 
with how movable property can be used to secure obligations.  
The common law and civil law approaches are different. One of 
Bornheim’s goals is to show that to “harmonize” them would be a 
mistake. He rejects “the law-and-economics suggestion that a Com-
mon Law system is inherently ‘better law’”3 in which the “benefits 
of the Common Law systems are intrinsically linked to what defines 
Common Law or Civil Law property.”4 He shows that both the com-
mon and the civil law allow debtors to secure the same types of ob-
ligations and to provide their creditors with similar security. He does 
so by making a painstaking and detailed comparison of the two. 
Those who claim that “a Common Law system is inherently 
‘better law’” should learn from his example. Their work rarely rests 
on a comparison of the economic advantages of the rules that govern 
contracts, property or, in Bornheim’s case, credit financing. Their 
conclusion often rests on gross comparisons showing the greater 
economic success of countries with common law systems. They of-
ten base their conclusions on stereotypes: for example, the common 
law shows greater concern for private autonomy. The stereotypes 
are wrong. Before the 19th century, there was no common law of 
contract in the modern sense but particular writs such as covenant 
and assumpsit. Common law contract doctrine, as we know it, was 
in large part imported in the 19th the century by borrowing and mod-
ifying civil law doctrine. Along with this doctrine came the “will 
theories” which showed concern for private autonomy but were 
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pioneered by civil law jurists who defined them in terms of autono-
mous choice. In reaction, many legal systems have allowed courts 
to refuse to enforce unfair contracts, but their willingness do so is 
not a distinguishing feature of civil law. The doctrine of unconscion-
ability has had greater scope in the United States than in England, 
and the German doctrine of Treu und Glauben has played a greater 
role than any comparable doctrine in France. Civil law jurisdictions 
have required the parties to exercise “good faith” in negotiating a 
contract, and yet comparative studies have shown that common law 
jurisdictions give relief in the same sorts of cases: when fraud is 
committed, promises are broken, or ideas are appropriated.5 As 
these studies show, the only way to determine how legal systems 
differ, let alone which is “better,” is as Bornheim does, by analyzing 
particular rules and their effects.  
As he observes, those who rely on comparisons between the eco-
nomic success of the common law and civil law systems have a 
“simplistic . . . understanding of the Civil Law/ Common Law dis-
tinction.”6 “[F]rom a functionalist perspective [their] simple bench-
marking approach . . . insufficiently accounts for functionally 
equivalent legal rules.”7 He describes the approach of Konrad Zwei-
gert and Hein Kötz, who start out “with the assumption that every 
legal system faces similar problems.”8 The goal of their “function-
alist approach” is “to examine how different legal systems tackle 
these similar problems.”9 There is a praesumptio similitudinis: 
where the problem is the same, the result will often be the same, 
despite a difference in how rules are formulated.10 
 
 5.  Edward Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 
(1987). 
 6.  Bornheim, supra note 1, at 66. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 64. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. (citing KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE 
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 33, 37–38 (3d ed. 
Mohr 1996)). 




Indeed, Bornheim’s book shows how successful a functionalist 
approach can be. Despite great differences in their rules, Bornheim 
shows how common law and civil law provide equivalent opportu-
nities for debtors to obtain funds on the security of their assets, for 
creditors to determine the priority of their claims against these as-
sets, and for third parties to be protected. Sometimes the differences 
are not merely in the rules but in the concepts in which they are for-
mulated. There is no civil law equivalent to the common law dis-
tinction between legal and equitable legal title. Yet Bornheim shows 
that by recognizing equitable title, the common law arrives at results 
like those the civil law achieves by allowing an owner to reclaim his 
property through an action of vindication.  
Bornheim then disposes of another argument for harmonization. 
Even if the civil law were at least as good as the common law in 
these respects, could it not be that that harmonization would avoid 
the difficulties of governing the same transactions by two different 
legal systems, particularly in Canada, where the difference exists 
between provinces? Bornheim considers “vertical integration” in 
which federal laws such as those governing insolvency must deal 
with the differences in the legal systems as to the rights of secured 
creditors. He considers the problems that arise when a transaction 
spans jurisdictions, for example, when a secured property is moved 
from one jurisdiction to another, or the rights a creditor is granted in 
one province must be perfected in another. His thorough and con-
vincing study should not only be of interest in bijural states such as 
Canada. Any proposal for supranational legislation will confront the 
problems of vertical integration. Any proposal for harmonizing na-
tional laws will have to consider whether the advantages of doing so 
could be attained instead by well-developed doctrines of interna-
tional private law (or conflict of laws, as common law systems 
would say).  
Bornheim’s analysis provides solid support, then, for his conclu-
sion that harmonization is not necessary to provide an effective way 
of using movable property to secure obligations. If I have a criticism, 




it is that he goes a step further. Quebec, like my state of Louisiana, 
was French before it became part of the British Empire by conquest 
and mine became part of the United States by purchase. In both 
cases, the preservation of French law has been identified with the 
preservation of a distinct culture. Indeed, since the enactment of the 
Civil Code, Frenchmen themselves have regarded it as a monument 
to their culture, much as Englishmen have regarded the common law 
as a hallmark of their own. To protect the civil law, according to this 
view, is to protect “the cultural identity of Québecers.”11 Bornheim 
quotes the distinguished French-Canadian jurist Paul-André Cré-
peau: the civil law is “l’un des plus beaux monuments, l’un des 
joyaux de notre patrimoine culturel.”12 According to Bornheim, 
what is “euphemistically referred to as ‘harmonization’” means “the 
abolishment of one legal system,”13 “a radical levelling of the legal 
culture of either Common Law or Civil Law, or both.”14 
Although he took pains to show that both systems arrive at sim-
ilar results, his defense of the cultural importance of civil law takes 
him in the opposite direction. He claims that despite these similari-
ties, the civil law embodies principles which are different and em-
body cultural values. He suggests that because of these principles, 
“Civil Law property rights are more secure than their Common Law 
counterparts.”15 “[T]he framework for vindication of property is 
more straightforward. . . . Unlike Common Law, Civil law has a 
clearly defined notion of ownership of movable property. . . . It is 
the most complete right in property in relation to everybody.”16 
One of these differences is that “the Common Law has no vin-
dication action.”17 Moreover, because the common law recognizes 
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“an equitable property right,”18 “its secured transactions law has not 
been fully integrated into its property law.”19 He immediately notes, 
however, that the importance of this distinction “should not be over-
emphasized.”20 Indeed, one of his achievements is to show that the 
common law recognition of equitable interests and the civil law vin-
dication action achieve largely the same results. Can one imagine, 
then, the difference in the way that these results are achieved con-
ceptually is “one of the joys of cultural patrimony” to which Cré-
peau referred? Bornheim began his book with a quotation: “There 
are topics of conversation more popular in public houses than the 
finer points of the equitable doctrine of the constructive trust.”21 I 
imagine that there are aspects of their cultural tradition dearer to the 
patrons of French bistros than the superiority of the action of vindi-
cation. 
Among the other differences he mentions are a civil law concern 
with the concept of patrimony (patrimoine), the “absolute” concept 
of ownership in civil law, and the idea that common law protects 
possession rather than ownership. 
According to Bornheim, “[t]he notion of patrimony is a differ-
entia specifica between Québec Civil Law and the Common Law.”22 
As he notes, “[t]he reception of [the] patrimony concept in French 
doctrine took place through the writings of Aubry and Rau, who saw 
themselves in the tradition of the German writer Zachariä.”23 In-
deed, the first edition of their treatise was a translation of Zachariä’s 
Handbuch des französischen Civilrechts. They improved it each edi-
tion, and it became one of the finest treatises of French civil law. 
The concept of patrimony was borrowed from Zachariä. He defined 
the German term Vermögen (wealth, assets) as comprising the things 
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(Gegenstände) that belong to a person, considered not as individual 
things, according to their individual characteristics, but as goods, 
according to their monetary value (Geldwerth). Considered in this 
way, they constituted a Ganze (whole) or Gesammtheit (ensem-
ble).24 Aubry and Rau explained that “[t]he ensemble of a person’s 
goods constitutes his patrimony (patrimoine).”25 “[O]ne can also, 
substituting . . . cause for effect, define patrimony as the ensemble 
of a person’s civil rights.”26 One has to wonder why such a concept 
should be regarded as a differentia specifica between civil and com-
mon law. It may be useful to have a definition of what is meant by 
a person’s assets, but one could explain French law without it, and 
in much the same way. French jurists would have done so had Aubry 
and Rau not happened to translate Zachariä’s Handbuch or if Zach-
ariä had not tried to define Vermögen. Common lawyers, had they 
chosen to do so, could have used the same definition to explain what 
they mean by “assets.”   
Another distinguishing feature of the civil law, according to 
Bornheim, is “the idea of absolute ownership.”27 It entered French 
law as “a result of the abolition of the seigneurial system and feudal 
law.”28 Before the Civil Code was enacted, French law distin-
guished two types of ownership: the dominium directum of the lord, 
which entitled him to feudal rent, and the dominium utile of the per-
son entitled to occupy and use the land but obligated to pay the rent. 
By abolishing this distinction, the French Civil Code has been said 
to have ended feudalism. Yet the significance of the distinction was 
symbolic. Economically, dual ownership was like a mortgage. One 
party had the use of the land. The other was entitled to periodic 
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payments and had his claim to them secured by the land.29 The right 
of the first party to use the land was as “absolute” before the aboli-
tion of dual ownership as afterwards. Similarly, William Black-
stone, borrowing from civil law, described the right of property as 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exer-
cises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe.”30 Yet the owner of an 
English fee simple held what had been a feudal fief. In either system, 
then, one could describe an owner’s rights as absolute. Nevertheless, 
in either system, to do so, one would have to qualify that statement 
by describing the many restrictions that prevent an owner from using 
his land in ways that bother his neighbors or from alienating it on 
whatever terms he chooses.  
Another distinction, according to Bornheim, is that traditionally 
the common law protects “possession” rather than ownership.31 He 
acknowledges, however, that the modern common law protects 
both.32 He criticizes an article I wrote with Ugo Mattei in which we 
showed that English common law courts first acknowledged that 
they protected possession as such in Asher v. Whitlock (1865).33 We 
cited many prior cases in which the courts said that the reason they 
protected a person who had possessed land for a long time or been 
forcibly expelled was that long possession or forcible expulsion was 
evidence of title.34 According to Bornheim, our mistake was that, 
when the courts spoke of title, we “assume[d] that the notion of ab-
solute ownership exists at law, and thus interpret any reference to 
‘title’ in the case law as a reference to absolute ownership.”35 Not at 
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all. Whatever the courts may have meant by “title,” they said one 
must have it to be protected, and that loss of possession mattered, 
not in itself, but because it could create a presumption of title.  
The reason the French Civil Code is a great achievement is not 
that it protects ownership as well as possession, as the common law 
now does, or that it symbolically broke with the feudal past by abol-
ishing dual ownership, or that it introduced the concept of patri-
moine, which it did not. The greatness of the Civil Code lies in the 
clarity with which it expressed principles of law that have a signifi-
cance which, if it is not universal, extends far beyond the orbit of 
French culture. It owes its clarity to the simplicity and elegance of 
the French language. It owes its significance to the aspiration of its 
drafters to formulate universal principles.36 For those reasons, it be-
came the model for most of the codes in force throughout the world. 
Those who share the same language and aspirations can be proud of 
it for those reasons without claiming that it rests on peculiarly 
French concepts. It would be a poorer code if it did. 
I was educated as a common lawyer, but I have made even more 
critical remarks about the idea that the common law embodies dis-
tinctively Anglo-American concepts of liberty. In an article I wrote 
in the year 2000, I expressed my wish that over the next century, the 
common law will lose the remaining traces of its English origins and 
come to look more like civil law.37 Features such as the doctrine of 
consideration, the nominate torts, the law of estates and future inter-
ests, and the treatment of a leasehold as an interest in property serve 
no good purpose. I closed by saying that one can admire the role that 
common lawyers played in the struggle for liberty when they op-
posed Charles I, which later inspired Americans who opposed 
George III. That struggle, however, has nothing to do with the Eng-
lish doctrines I mentioned. Moreover, Englishmen today do not need 
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protection against a return of the Stuart dynasty any more than 
Americans against reincorporation in the British Empire.  
 
James Gordley 
Tulane Law School 
 
